

# Agenda for Community Supervision Subgroup #3

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*December 18, 2017*

1. Consensus Polices & Questions to Answer
  - a. Strengthen Supervision Through Incentives
  - b. Frontloading Resources
  
2. Additional Information to Improve Collection of Restitution and Other Financial Obligations
  
  
3. Additional Policy Proposals
  - a. Reinvestment Victim Roundtable Priorities
  - b. Evidence-Based Risk and Needs Assessment
  - c. Removing Barriers to Reentry
  - d. Effective Compliance Violation Responses
  - e. Additional Studies

# Community Supervision Data Findings

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1. The supervision population is 28,734 people, down 8% from 31,227 in 2010.
2. People stay on supervision for an average of two years or longer.
3. Supervision success rates have gone up nearly 30%. Less than one-fourth of supervision rates end in failure, down from a third.
  - a. Despite this increasing success, 4,200 people failed on supervision in 2016. In that year, revocations accounted for 31% of all prison admissions.
4. One out of every four admissions to prison in 2016 was for violating the rules of supervision.

# Consensus Policies & Remaining Questions

## Strengthen Supervision through Incentives

- Research: Compliance credits are shown to provide incentives for positive behavior change while freeing up resources.<sup>1</sup>
- Current practice: 20 days of credit for 30 days of compliance, including paying fees (3 months with no payment allowed), for people convicted of crimes committed on January 1st, 2011, or after.

**Policy recommendation**: Establish a policy that supports compliant behavior through incentives:

1. Open eligibility for compliance credits to aggregate supervision sentences of 365 days or more.
2. Expand compliance credits to those currently on supervision with offenses before January 1st, 2011.
3. Expand compliance credits to 30 days of credit for each month of compliance.
4. Implement a continuum of small administrative incentives such as reduced reporting, eliminating curfew, bus fare, waived supervision fees, and/or verbal recognition.
5. Allow probation agents to give additional credits for consistent participation in education classes, treatment programs, or other achievements.

Remaining question:

- a. *Limit the definition of “noncompliance” to those who willfully refuse to pay their financial obligations?*

## Frontloading Resources

- Research: The public safety benefit of supervision declines a great deal after the first year to 18 months for people who have been successful.<sup>2</sup>
- Current practice: Anyone on probation can serve a maximum of five years on probation.<sup>3</sup>

**Policy recommendation**: Establish a policy that allows probationers to concentrate / frontload resources on the critical time when probationers first enter supervision through focused and reduced probation lengths.

Option 1: Reduce maximum term of probation.

- a. Probation terms would be a maximum of 2 years?

Option 2: Create graduated probation maximum terms.

- a. Misdemeanor probation a maximum of 1 year and felony probation a maximum of 3 years?
- b. Determine probation terms by offense class?

<u>Unc. Felony</u>	<u>Fel. A</u>	<u>Fel. B</u>	<u>Fel. C</u>	<u>Fel. D</u>	<u>Fel. E</u>	<u>Fel. F</u>	<u>Unc. Misd</u>	<u>Misd. A</u>	<u>Misd. B</u>	<u>Misd. C</u>
5 yrs	5 yrs	3 yrs	3 yrs	2 yrs	2 yrs	1 yr	6 mos.	6 mos.	6 mos.	6 mos.

<sup>1</sup> Petersilia, J. (2007). Employ behavioral contracting earned discharge parole. *Criminology and Public Policy* (6)(4): 807-14.

<sup>2</sup> National Research Council, Parole, Desistance from Crime, and Community Integration (2007); Ryken Grattet, Joan Petersilia, and Jeff Lin, Parole Violations and Revocations in California (2008); The Pew Charitable Trusts, Maximum Impact: Targeting Supervision on Higher-Risk People, Places, and Times (2009).

<sup>3</sup> S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-440

# Additional Information to Improve Collection of Restitution and Other Financial Obligations

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## Research Principles for Restitution and Financial Obligations:

1. Courts have seen success in using peoples' means to establish fine and fee amounts and payments:
  - a. One court determined court fines based on an ability to pay while also implementing individualized collection strategies like personal reminders, budget counseling, and home visits. The results: <sup>4</sup>
    - The average dollar amount of fines went up 25%;
    - For people who could not or did not pay in full, more people paid something rather than nothing;
    - Collection rates improved—85% of people eventually paid their fines in full, as opposed to 76% the prior year;
    - Individuals whose fines were based on income and had individualized collection plans had fewer post-sentence hearings due to payment success and fewer arrest warrants for failure to appear.
2. Restitution is a vital part of making a victim whole again—both financially and emotionally—and for holding people accountable for their actions. <sup>5</sup>
  - Studies show that a clear understanding of the restitution process increases victim satisfaction. <sup>6</sup>
3. There is a greater likelihood that people will pay their criminal justice obligations when ability to pay is considered.
  - A survey of restitution directors found that people are more likely to pay their restitution in full when: 1) the restitution award is based on their assets; and 2) responses to nonpayment are tempered by ability to pay. <sup>7</sup>
  - A lack of information about income and assets often results in amounts that are either beyond what people can pay or insufficient for the severity of the crime, such that the sentence does not achieve its intended retributive effect. <sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Winterfield, Laura A., and Sally T. Hillsman, National Institute of Justice (January 1993). "The Staten Island Day-Fine Project." <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/138538NCJRS.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> National Crime Victim Law Institute (2013), "Ensuring Full Restitution for Crime Victims: Polyvictims as a Case Study in Overcoming Causation Challenges," <https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/15462-ensuring-full-restitution-for-crime>; Theodore R. Sangalis, "Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex Trafficked Person Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act," *Fordham Law Review*, (2011) <http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4658&context=flr>.

<sup>6</sup> R. Barry Ruback, Penn State University, Cares, Alison C., Central Connecticut State University, and Hoskins, Stacy. N., Penn State University, "Crime Victims' Perceptions of Restitution: The Importance of Payment and Understanding," (2008) <http://pacrimstats.info/PCCDReports/EvaluationResearch/Completed%20Research/Victims%20Services/Restitution/Crime%20Victim%27s%20Perceptions%20of%20Restitution.pdf>; Wemmers and Canuto (2002).

<sup>7</sup> American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Victim Witness Project (1989), "Improving Enforcement of Court-Ordered Restitution," <https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/criminal/id/253>; R. Barry Ruback and Mark H. Bergstrom, "Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: Purposes, Effects, and Implications," (2006), *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 33: 242, <http://www.center-school.org/restitution/pdf/EconomicSanctionsInCriminalJusticePurposesEffectsAndImplications.pdf>.


<sup>8</sup> R. Barry Ruback and Mark H. Bergstrom, "Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: Purposes, Effects, and Implications," (2006), *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 33: 242, <http://www.center-school.org/restitution/pdf/EconomicSanctionsInCriminalJusticePurposesEffectsAndImplications.pdf>.

4. When financial obligations become overwhelming, it can create barriers to successful reentry. More specifically, initial studies show that there's a tipping point, where the amount due is so great that it impedes a person's stability, making them more likely to recidivate.<sup>9</sup>
- People returning to the community from prison can owe as much as 60% of their income to criminal justice debts.<sup>10</sup>
  - Substantial debt compared to a person's earning power can result in housing, food, and medication instability; decreased ability to support children; and, an increased likelihood of criminal justice involvement.<sup>11</sup>
  - One recent study showed that high financial penalties increased the likelihood of recidivism for juveniles.<sup>12</sup>

**How will changes to supervision impact PPP's budget?**

PPP Budget – Projected 2018

<b>State funds</b>		<b>\$37.18mil</b>
<b>Revenue funds</b>	Court fees	\$8.79mil
	Supervision fees	\$5.23mil
	20% restitution fee	\$942k
	Sex offender monitoring program	\$81k
	Ignition interlock	\$450.5k
<b>Federal grants</b>		<b>\$618k</b>



Potential Impacts to Revenue Funds (\$15.5 mil, 29% of total PPP budget):

Greater Net Income	Lesser Net Income
1. Administrative release (Release Workgroup)	1. Shorter supervision sentences
2. Means-based payment	
3. Shorter supervision sentences	
4. Compliance credits	

<sup>9</sup>Carl Formoso, 2003, "Determining the Composition and Collectibility of Child Support Arrearages", Washington State Department of Social and Health Services. Carl Reynolds, et al, 2009, "A Framework to Improve How Fines, Fees, Restitution, and Child Support are Assessed and Collected from People Convicted of Crimes", Council of State Governments Justice Center, <https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2009-CSG-TXOCA-report.pdf>

<sup>10</sup>Harris, Evans & Beckett (2010), "Drawing Blood from Stones," <https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2010-Blood-from-Stones-AJSj.pdf>

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>12</sup>Alex R. Piquero, Ph.D. University of Texas at Dallas & Wesley G. Jennings, Ph.D. University of South Florida, Justice System Imposed Financial Penalties Increase the Likelihood of Recidivism in a Sample of Adolescent Offenders (June 2016) available at <http://debtorsprison.jlc.org/documents/JLC-Debtors-Prison-criminology-study.pdf>

Two Types of Payment Structures:

**Louisiana Model:** For those who are assessed as indigent, people on supervision owe one day's pay per month to cover all fees and fines, prioritizing restitution.<sup>13</sup>

- *Milwaukee study:* This study showed low-income people with day fines were more likely to pay their fines and were more likely to pay in full than those with a conventional fine (a fixed fine not based on income).<sup>14</sup>

**Discretionary income calculation (student loan example):** Discretionary income is assessed as income in excess of 150% of the federal poverty line and reasonable and fair monthly payments are 10% of discretionary income.<sup>15</sup>

Louisiana example	Student loan example
Earnings: <b>\$2,000/month</b>	Earnings: <b>\$2,010/month</b> (200% of the federal poverty line)
Daily income: <b>\$66.67</b> (\$2,000 ÷ 30)	Discretionary income, anything over 150% of poverty line: <b>\$502.50</b> (\$2,010 ÷ 4)
<b>\$33.34 for restitution / \$33.33 for other fees/fines</b>	Monthly payment amount, 10% of discretionary income: <b>\$50.25</b> (\$502.50 * 10%)
	<b>\$25.13 for restitution / \$25.12 for other fees/fines</b>

Consensus payment plan policies:

1. Add statutory language for the solicitor to use in explaining to a victim's family how restitution is made.

Option 1: Require restitution hearings to determine an award the defendant has the ability to pay, while also collecting information to set a maximum monthly amount to pay for all fees.

Option 2: Require restitution hearings to be held only when a judge proposes restitution awards over a certain amount.

Option 3: Give clerks of court income information, for a pre-sentencing report using either the Louisiana or student loan model on achievable total monthly payments. PPP agents can use the post-restitution amount to allot other fines and fees.

Additional payment policy changes:

- ✓ Require payments only for a certain number of months, to further incentivize restitution and fee payment.
- ✓ Delay payments for the first months upon reentry to support community adjustment and stabilization.
- ✓ Institute reminder notices prior to payment due date and if payment is not made or received.
- ✓ No longer mandate PPP to bring individuals back to court after 6 months of not paying restitution.

<sup>13</sup> La. C.Cr.P. Art. 875.1

<sup>14</sup> The study used a minimum payment amount and a maximum payment, with level of crime and income taken into account. McDonald, Douglas, C., Editor, Judith Greene & Charles Worzella, U.S. Department of Justice, "Day Fines in American Courts: The Staten Island and Milwaukee Experiments" (1992). <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/136611NCJRS.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Student Loan Law, 3.3.3.3 Calculating the IBR, PAY or REPAYE Repayment Amount (5th ed. 2015)

# New Policy Discussions

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## Reinvestment Priorities of the Victim, Survivor, and Advocate Roundtable

The Victim, Survivor, and Advocate Roundtable, held in Columbia on October 13, included 27 advocates, practitioners, and survivors. The goal of the roundtable discussion was to hear from and understand the needs of the victim and survivor community and identify priority areas. That discussion produced the below priorities:

### 1. Batterers Intervention Programs funding and use of guidelines

- From the report: “An investment specifically in Batterers Intervention Programs (in the community and in prisons) can help hold batterers accountable and reduce recidivism in domestic violence crimes, while decreasing the likelihood that domestic violence victims will end up paying for program participation.”
- Currently, there is a dearth of Batterers Intervention Programs in the state, and, while advocates have recently created guidelines, there is no requirement to use these guidelines nor is there funding to implement them or monitor their use.

Option: Adopt statewide guidelines with the requirement that programs implement and monitor them, while funding implementation, monitoring, and additional programs.

### 2. Improvements in restitution collection and processes

- Currently, PPP collects restitution for people on supervision. For those who are not on supervision, counties should collect restitution, but some do not.
  - i. Previously, PPP collected all restitution payments, but counties voiced frustration due to the percentage of the payment PPP kept. Thereby, PPP stopped collecting restitution for non-supervision populations and counties assumed this role. However, several counties have not redeveloped collection systems.
- When restitution is turned into a civil judgment, some counties will not accept payment.

Option: Hold a restitution processes roundtable including one SCDC victim service provider, one PPP victim service providers, three clerks of court with geographic distribution, two people who have submitted restitution payments, two probation agents, and two people who have received restitution payments, to determine the following:

- The best process and government agency to assume the duties of restitution collection currently under the purview of PPP and county courts for the adult population;
- The best process and government agency to assume the duties of restitution collection currently being completed by SCDC for the YOA population;
- Useful data measurements to ensure effective restitution collection.

On or before January 1, 2018, the Restitution Processes Roundtable will submit a report of its findings and recommendations to the Sentencing Reform Oversight Committee.

### 3. Streamline the sex offender registry to make it less “bloated” and more useful to law enforcement and victims

Option: On or before January 1, 2018, a designated state agency shall study sex offender registration requirements, with the intent of determining practices and requirements for a more useful database and submit a report of its findings and recommendations to the Sentencing Reform Oversight Committee.

4. Funding necessary programming for people reentering society and people who have been victimized

Option: Fund a grant program for counties and localities to set up Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils to act as a granting organization to community-based services.

- Several states have established local funding mechanisms. As an example, Colorado established a grant program for a broader set of recidivism-reducing goals, including improving academic achievement, strengthening families, promoting recovery from trauma, supporting crime survivors, and increasing employment.
  - What goals and factors should be targeted?

5. Mandatory training for judges, solicitors, and law enforcement about victims' rights, victim/survivor services, and victim sensitivity.

- Notably, South Carolina has seen an increase in female arrests for domestic violence, likely stemming from law enforcement arresting both parties in a domestic violence scenario. This causes both parties harm, can send children into protective services, and can discourage victims from reporting.

Option: Fund training for judges, solicitors, and law enforcement.

6. Mental health treatment and services, both for victims/survivors and people convicted of crimes

Option: Fund mental health treatment and services.

## **Evidence-Based Risk and Needs Tool Use**

### Research Principles about Risk and Need Tool Validation:

1. Validating a risk and needs tool is critical to the accuracy of the tool. When a tool is validated on the population it is assessing, it is more predictive in determining an appropriate risk level.<sup>16</sup>

### South Carolina Practices Regarding Risk Tool Use:

1. SB 1154 required that a "validated risk and needs tool" be used in South Carolina.<sup>17</sup> PPP contracted with Northpointe to use the COMPAS tool, and has since implemented it.
2. PPP also has validated the tool on the parole population, but has not yet validated it on the South Carolina probation population.

### Policy Option:

Provide funding to validate the tool by a third party and establish a date by which the tool will be validated.

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<sup>16</sup> The National Center for State Courts report found: "When one risk assessment tool originally developed in the Midwest was adopted without modification for use with probationers in New York City, researchers found that several items in the risk assessment were not related to recidivism in the New York sample." available at [ncsc.org/~media/microsites/files/csi/bja%20rna%20final%20report\\_combined%20files%208-22-14.ashx](https://ncsc.org/~media/microsites/files/csi/bja%20rna%20final%20report_combined%20files%208-22-14.ashx). Also see: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44087.pdf>. Finding: Another important reason to validate tools is to minimize potential racial disparities. Because some of the static factors that tools use can be disproportionately high among black and Latino populations, considering race while setting up cutoff points can make classification more accurate.

<sup>17</sup> S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-10; S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-32; S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-280



## Remove Barriers to Reentry: Stabilization Assistance Benefits

### Research & Data about Stabilization Assistance Benefits:

1. During the tough-on-crime era of the 1990s, the federal government instituted a ban on stabilization assistance programs for people with felony drug convictions. The ban allowed states to opt out, which many states have done during the shift to being smart on crime.
  - South Carolina is one of just five remaining states to maintain the federal government's ban on people with drug felonies from receiving food stabilization benefits or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and one of 13 to maintain it with income stabilization benefits or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).<sup>18</sup>
  - Southern neighbors have recently lifted the federal bans, including Alabama in 2015<sup>19</sup> and Louisiana in 2017.<sup>20</sup>
2. Food assistance benefits have been shown to vastly improve outcomes for children.
  - A recent study showed that adults who had access to food assistance as young children reported better health, and women who had access to food stamps as young children reported improved economic self-sufficiency (as measured by employment, income, poverty status, high school graduation, and program participation).<sup>21</sup>
3. The federal government funds SNAP benefits and splits the administrative costs of the program with the state.<sup>22</sup>

### Policy Option for Stabilization Assistance Benefits:

Remove restrictions on stabilization assistance (food assistance and income assistance) for people with drug felonies.

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<sup>18</sup> Mississippi, Georgia, Wyoming, and West Virginia are the only other states joining South Carolina in fully banning SNAP for people with drug felony convictions. Hager, Eli, The Marshall Project (2016). "Six States Where Felons Can't Get Food Stamps," available at [themarshallproject.org/2016/02/04/six-states-where-felons-can-t-get-food-stamps](http://themarshallproject.org/2016/02/04/six-states-where-felons-can-t-get-food-stamps).

<sup>19</sup> 2015 Bill Text AL S.B. 67 (Section 12), available at <http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/ALISON/SearchableInstruments/2015RS/PrintFiles/SB67-enr.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> La. R.S. § 46:233.3

<sup>21</sup> Dean, Stacy, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2016). "Balancing State Flexibility Without Weakening SNAP's Success," available at [cbpp.org/food-assistance/balancing-state-flexibility-without-weakening-snaps-success](http://cbpp.org/food-assistance/balancing-state-flexibility-without-weakening-snaps-success).

<sup>22</sup> CBPP (2017) "Policy Basics: Introduction to SNAP," available at: [cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap](http://cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap)

## Remove Barriers to Reentry: Identification at Reentry

### South Carolina Practices Regarding Identification at Reentry:

1. SB 1154 required all inmates to have a state-issued identification card.<sup>23</sup> This change required the Department of Motor Vehicles, Department of Corrections, and the Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services to work together to accomplish this goal.
2. While this process is underway, a number of barriers remain:
  - Two documents necessary for a state-issued identification card are a birth certificate and social security card. Vital records charges a \$12 fee for birth certificates, which most people do not have while in prison. Inmates must gather the required supporting information to apply for a birth certificate and Social Security card, but if they do not have the means to pay the fee, they're unable to complete the process.
  - For people convicted of violent crimes, state-issued IDs must have a code for "violent offender" on the card which would be an indicator for law enforcement. Instead of a code, the DMV uses the label "violent offender." The DMV charges a \$50 fee for this specialized service.<sup>24</sup>
  - Once someone has state-issued identification, the only barrier to earning a driver's license (presuming the individual previously had a valid driver's license) is also the \$10 fee for a replacement license.

### Policy Options for Ensuring Identification Cards at Reentry:

1. For birth certificates:
  - Fund the Department of Vital Records to be able to waive the fee for birth certificates for people in prison.
2. For violent offender designation:
  - Fund the Department of Motor Vehicles to be able to waive the fee for affixing the code.
  - Align practice more closely with the statute, using a code rather than the "violent offender" label, ensuring easier job application and reentry.
  - Eliminate the "violent offender" code requirement, thereby eliminating the fee.
3. For driver's licenses:
  - Fund the Department of Motor Vehicles to be able to waive or reduce the replacement license fee within six months of release.
4. Require a two-year provisional driver's license contingent on payment compliance for anyone who leaves prison, to encourage payment of fines and fees.

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<sup>23</sup> S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-2130

<sup>24</sup> S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-148

## Effective Compliance Violation Responses

### Research on incarceration:

1. A growing body of research tells us that incarceration can be criminogenic, or make one more likely to commit another crime.<sup>25</sup>
  - Specifically, technical violators of probation serving a period of confinement (jail or prison) had higher recidivism than offenders sanctioned in the community.<sup>26</sup>
2. Even short lengths of detention can be criminogenic, as shown in pre-trial populations, where even being detained for just two days or more is related to increased recidivism after disposition. As the length of time detained increases, so does the likelihood of recidivism.<sup>27</sup>
  - For people deemed low risk of flight or being rearrested pre-trial, the recidivism rate increases as days detained increase<sup>28</sup>:

Days Incarcerated	Likelihood of Recidivism Pretrial
2-3 days	39% increase
4-7 days	50% increase
8-14 days	56% increase

### South Carolina Practices & Data:

1. In South Carolina, probation agents can issue warrants for people on supervision, including compliance violations.<sup>29</sup> For many compliance violations, the agent or supervisor response could be a range of lower-level administrative responses, a citation, or a warrant.<sup>30</sup>
2. PPP policy states that citations should be used unless there is a compelling reason for a warrant.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Bales, William D. and Alex R. Piquero, (2011). "Assessing the impact of imprisonment on recidivism." *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 8: 71–101. Retrieved from doi.org/10.1007/s11292-011-9139-3; Nagin, Daniel S., Francis T. Cullen, and Cheryl Lero Jonson, (2009). "Imprisonment and reoffending." In (Michael Tonry, ed.), *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, vol. 38. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

<sup>26</sup> E. K. Drake & S. Aos (2012). *Confinement for Technical Violations of Community Supervision: Is There an Effect on Felony Recidivism?* (Document No. 12-07-1201). Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

<sup>27</sup> Lowenkamp, Christopher T., VanNostrand, Marie, and Alexander Holsinger, (2013). "The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention." The Laura and John Arnold Foundation. Retrieved from arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF\_Report\_hidden-costs\_FNL.pdf

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> S.C. Code Ann. §24-21-450; see also Compliance violations: a resistance to follow basic supervision guidelines such as maintaining contact, meeting financial requirements and drug testing, as well as difficulties in maintaining a stable residence and employment. Failure to address substance abuse problems also falls into this category; and community safety violations: a violation that places the community, individually or collectively, in danger. Failure to comply with restrictions designed to limit the offender's movement in the community, all violations committed by a sex offender except purely financial violations, and weapons violations are examples of community safety violations (South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, Policy & Procedure No. 701.)

<sup>30</sup> South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, "Report to the Sentencing Reform Oversight Committee" (November 2016).

<sup>31</sup> South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services Policy & Procedure 702

3. In 2016, warrants and citations were used in similar amounts (those numbers have dropped from 2010).

Warrants Issued in 2016	Citations Issued in 2016	Total Warrants and Citations
8,473	8,982	17,455

Compliance Revocations in 2016	New Offense Revocations in 2016	Total Revocations
3,097	587	3,684

4. When warrants were issued in 2016, judges and other supervising authorities did not revoke supervision for compliance violations in 5,376 cases.

- This process is expensive: one Arkansas locality interviewed a police station and found that each arrest cost the municipality \$216.60 and an additional \$55/day (the cost of detaining someone for one day).<sup>32</sup>

Policy Option:

Use citations only for technical violations (not including public safety technical violations). This would result in a scheduled court appearance without prior detention. If the supervisee fails to appear in court, the agent can issue a warrant.

**Additional Studies & Training**

- ✓ Commission a study on where LLR certification or licensing makes restrictions on felons.
- ✓ Commission a study and website similar to the Office of Aging Provider Network about service providers for reentry needs.
- ✓ Provide training to the DMV similar to what is currently available at DEW to instruct staff how to assist newly released persons.

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<sup>32</sup> Blytheville Courier News, Sunday, May 20, 2012, available at [blythevillecourier.com/story/1851176.html](http://blythevillecourier.com/story/1851176.html). To calculate the cost, the study included the cost of being detained, the staff time to answer and respond to the call, and fuel needed.